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The first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union brought change
in Russia at a pace most observers would have deemed unthinkable at the end of
1991. The turnaround from a centralized, "command" economy to a free-market
economy was roughly comparable to causing a 20-ton trailer truck to spin 1800 in
direction on a crowded highway.
In order to give shape to a new economy, a statutory and regulatory framework
was essential-one within which the newly privatized segments of the economy
could function effectively. The Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies (the "JSC
Law"),' enacted in late 1995, the Federal Law on the Securities Market, which took
I. See Federal Law on Joint-Stock Companies, available at http//www.fipc.ru/fipctest/lawjsc.html
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
76
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 16
effect in 1996, and the Federal Law on Protection of Investors, enacted in 1997,
were critically needed steps forward.
This first decade following the rebirth of Russia as a nation ended with
another monumental step forward-the promulgation by the Federal Commission
on the Securities Market (FCSM) of a draft Corporate Governance Code (the
"Code").2 The Code was publicly presented by the FCSM in final form on April
4, 2002. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the significance of the Code, to
summarize its key provisions, to comment on the merits of various provisions,
and to consider the future of the Code.
Occasional references herein to U.S. law or practice are not intended to
suggest that the U.S. precedents should be adopted. Such references are merely
for comparative interest and derive from the author's experience with corporate
governance principles and practice in the United States.
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CODE AND EVALUATION
The Code represents an extraordinary advance in the furtherance of good
corporate governance in Russia. Its value derives principally from these factors:
1. The Code constitutes a powerful statement by the Russian Government,
following extensive consultations with business groups, that improvements
in corporate governance are critical to the success of the free market
system and the attraction of capital. The promulgation of the Code serves
as a dramatic declaration of national policy.
2. The standards that are set forth in the Code will constitute a codification of
"best practices," as seen by the FCSM and the forward-looking segment of
the business community, and will serve as a benchmark for evaluating
corporate governance practices and procedures in Russian companies.
3. The standards set forth in the Code will provide guidelines for boards of
directors and corporate executives who seek to achieve better corporate
governance in their own companies.
4. The presently recommended disclosure (which could be required by
FCSM regulation in the future) of the extent of compliance or non-
compliance, if such disclosure is made, will provide a basis for rating a
company's corporate governance structure and practices by present
stockholders, potential investors, rating agencies, securities brokers and
dealers, securities exchanges, creditors, employees, suppliers, and
customers. The level of investor confidence in a company will be
significantly affected by the disclosures.
2. See The Russian Corporate Governance Code (2002), available at: http://www.rid.ru/db.php?=516&
l=en (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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5. Stockholders will put pressure on their boards of directors and top
executive officers to meet the standards of the Code. Boards of directors
will be motivated to make improvements in corporate governance
practices that would not otherwise have been made.
6. The very process of studying the Code by and on behalf of corporate
directors and officers, and the discussion that its promulgation has
generated and will generate, should enhance both corporate and public
awareness of the elements of good corporate governance.
7. As an educational tool, the Code has tremendous value. It can serve as a
textbook or guidebook and source of new approaches for corporate
directors and executives, whether or not they accept or reject its provisions.
8. The Code lays great emphasis on ethical standards, as distinct from
statutory standards, and recognizes that ethical standards are often more
demanding than the law's requirements. Placing ethical concepts at the
forefront of corporate governance will promote important values for the
operation of a free-market economy.
There are various provisions of the Code with which many observers will
disagree, and there will surely be controversy as to the need for and justification
for various of its recommendations. However, the prospect of criticism and
debate is clearly a positive factor rather than a negative one in the evaluation of
the Code's significance. Debate will raise consciousness and put a spotlight on
the subject matter of corporate governance-a subject matter which was
significantly neglected until at least the mid-1990s. In this sense, the Code cannot
fail to be a success, even if not all its recommendations are accepted by many
Russian companies.
II. PURPOSES AND PREMISES OF THE CODE
In the broadest sense, the objective of the Code is to increase the attractiveness of
Russia to investors and to promote the economic growth of Russia. In opting for a free-
market system, Russia has entrusted to non-governmental entities the functioning of a
vast economy, only some portions of which remain owned and controlled by the state.
The most fundamental premise of the Code is that the corporate entities to
which the economy has been entrusted must be managed in the best interests of
all the persons who have provided or will provide the necessary capital. The
Code recognizes and builds on the proposition that attracting the capital required
for the economic growth of Russia requires investor confidence in corporate
management's willingness and ability to act in the best interests of all the owners,
including minority shareholders.
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The Code builds on the basic governance structures established by the JSC Law
and seeks to make each element more effective. The protection of shareholders and
equal treatment of shareholders rights are dominant themes. The implementation of
these principles will surely increase the attractiveness of Russian joint stock
companies.
III. How THE CODE WAS DEVELOPED
The development of the Code, while a dramatic advance for Russia, was in
an historical sense a continuation of a trend toward improvement of corporate
governance in free-market economies of the world. Beginning a quarter century
ago, a vast ferment of activity in the United States brought about many changes
in the way U.S. companies are governed. The United Kingdom undertook similar
advances. Countries of Central Europe that engaged in massive privatizations
found the need for codification of corporate governance ground rules. In May of
1999, the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") issued a draft document entitled "Principles of Corporate Governance."
This document was implemented with specific reference to Russia by a recently
promulgated "White Paper on Corporate Governance in Russia," which
highlights particular needs in Russia and makes particularized recommendations
in furtherance of the "Principles."
Igor V. Kostikov was appointed to his position as Chairman of the FCSM by
President Putin on February 1, 2000. The concept of the Code was initiated by
Chairman Kostikov in April 2000. The initial work on the Code was undertaken
internally, within the FCSM. In September of 2000, the concept and the initial
work were given support by the heads of missions to the OECD in Paris. Also in
October of 2000, a Coordination Council for Corporate Governance was created
under the auspices of the FCSM.
Chairman Kostikov carried the message as to the evolution of the proposed
Code to a special session of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
in January of 2001.
The work continued, with the active participation of representatives of some
of Russia's most important companies, including participants in the securities
markets. By April of 2001 four chapters of the draft Code had been published.
Chairman Kostikov continued his policy of making public presentations, and
some twenty-two conferences and workshops concerning the draft Code were
held in fourteen different regions of Russia.
An international advisory consortium, financed by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), assisted in the drafting process.
On September 18, 2001, a draft of the Code was issued and released for
public comment. With a view to the importance of the Code in the eyes of
Western investors, in October of 2001, Chairman Kostikov made presentations to
groups within five organizations in the United States, namely the East-West
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Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-Russia Business Council,
Georgetown University and the Institute for International Finance.
Back in Russia, Chairman Kostikov outlined the draft Code at a hearing of
the State Duma, and on October 29, 2001, the draft Code was presented to the
Advisory Board for Foreign Investments of the Government of the Russian
Federation.
On November 28, 2001, the draft Code was presented to a Plenary Meeting of
the Russian Government and was approved. The Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, stated:
"The compliance with the norms established in the Corporate Governance Code
should improve the transparency of Russian Companies and increase the flow of
investment."
Comments on the September 18 draft continued to pour into the FCSM; the
recommendations made by commentators were categorized and computerized;
and internal meetings resulted in further changes. By mid-January 2002, most of
the comments had been dealt with-either by modifications in the draft or
rejection. A revised draft was prepared in late January, and a final version was
submitted on January 31, 2002 for approval at a meeting of FCSM in February,
with final publication in April of 2002.
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Chairman Kostikov has emphasized that the Code is only part of a coordinated
effort toward improved corporate governance under the Putin administration.
Statutory change has already taken place in the form of amendments to the JSC
Law. Amendments to the Law on the Securities Market designed to enhance the
enforcement powers of the FCSM took effect on August 7, 2001. A draft Law on
Affiliated Persons that would achieve greater transparency as to the true ownership
of corporations has passed a first reading in the Duma. A draft Law on Insider
Trading has been submitted to the Duma, and amendments to the Criminal Code that
enhance enforcement powers and toughen sanctions for non-disclosure of required
information and for providing false or misleading information took effect on March
4,2002.
The FCSM also proposes the launching of a major educational campaign to
inform corporate officers and directors of the key elements of the Code. In late
November 2001, the Russian Institute of Directors was established on the
initiative of a group of major Russian companies which are seeking to improve
their corporate governance practices and their image among investors. The
Institute will develop professional standards and ethical rules for corporate
directors and officers. It has already initiated a program of training for corporate
directors, including government-appointed directors of companies in which the
federal government of Russia holds shares, in cooperation with the Center for
International Private Enterprise, a U.S. Chamber of Commerce affiliate.
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Thus, the promulgation of the Code may be viewed as an element in a
broader program to effect corporate governance improvements in Russia.
V. VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE CODE AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS
The Code clearly states that its application is voluntary.3 However, the fact
that the Code is voluntary in nature will enhance rather than detract from its
beneficial influence.
Hand-in-hand with this fundamental feature of the Code is the recommendation
that companies include in their quarterly report for the fourth quarter "a report on the
company's compliance with the recommendations of this Code, indicating whether the
company follows all the recommendations or only some of them.
'A
The concept of disclosure of the extent of compliance with the key
provisions of the Code has important precedents. For example, the so-called
London Combined Code is not mandatory for companies listed on the London
Stock Exchange, but such companies must disclose information as to their
compliance with the recommendations set forth in the London Combined Code.
The drafters of the Code also saw precedents for mandatory disclosure of
voluntary Code compliance in the requirements of the Toronto Stock Exchange,
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the Malaysian Corporate Governance Code, and
the King Commission Report on Corporate Governance Practices in South
Africa.
The FCSM plan is that the present recommendation of voluntary disclosure
of the extent of compliance will become mandatory. The FCSM is targeting June
of 2003 as the time when disclosure of the extent of compliance would be
required by FCSM regulation.
VI. CHAPTER 1. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Chapter 1 of the Code consists of a summary statement of principles that are
the basis for the detailed provisions of the Code set forth in succeeding chapters.
This summary statement is intended also to "serve as fundamental guidelines to
be observed in the absence of specific recommendations."'
Rather than setting forth the Chapter 1 principles, I shall treat them as a part
of the discussion of succeeding chapters.
3. The heading of § 4 of the Introduction reads: "The Code sets forth recommendations with respect to
the best practices of corporate conduct, but is, however, not obligatory."
4. See The Russian Corporate Governance Code, supra note 2, at ch.7, § 2.2, 1 4.
5. See id. at ch. 1, introductory 4.
2002 / The FCSM Corporate Governance Code for Russian Companies
VII. CHAPTER 2. GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING: INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS
Chapter 2 of the Code deals exclusively with the functioning of the shareholders
in their capacity as decision-makers. Accordingly, the focus is on general shareholder
meetings, both annual and extraordinary. The principles that underlie Chapter 2 are
stated in the introductory paragraphs as follows:
Shareholders that participate in a company risk their capital in doing so.
Shareholders are the real owners of the company, and must be able to
receive detailed and reliable accounts of the policies pursued by the
company from the board of directors and executive bodies.
A prerequisite for shareholders' trust in their company is the establishment of
a procedure for holding annual meetings that assures the equitable
treatment of all company shareholders, while not being overly expensive
or complicated for them.
The recommendations of Chapter 2 are principally oriented toward
(1) assuring the availability to all shareholders of the information
that enables them to vote intelligently on the matters presented
for a shareholder vote; and
(2) assuring the means and mechanics for exercising the right to
vote.
With respect to the first of these, the availability of information, the Code
addresses two broad categories of information needed by stockholders, namely:
(1) information needed to evaluate the continuing operations of
the company; and
(2) information needed to make decisions on the issues allocated
to the exclusive competence of the shareholders by the JSC
Law.
As to the first of these categories, the Code refers in section 1.3.1 to the
informational requirements of the JSC Law and regulations issued by the FCSM,
and then encourages adoption of charter provisions that would go beyond those
requirements, in furtherance of the objective of informed shareholders.
In particular, it is recommended that in addition to the submission of annual
statements as prescribed by the law, the charter of the company should
stipulate that the board of directors should also present its report to
shareholders to allow the company's performance indicators and growth
prospects to be discussed at the general shareholders meeting, and to enable
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assessment by shareholders of the existing company management practices
6
and the policies pursued by the board of directors and executive bodies.
Section 1.3.2 points out that the board of directors of the company may make
available to shareholders other materials in addition to those listed in the charter.
The second broad category of information needed by shareholders is the
information required to vote on particular agenda items other than election of the
board of directors. The Code states in section 1.3.3:
To make decisions on the agenda items, shareholders need to comprehensively
assess the implications a decision may have for the company.
The thrust of this statement is in marked contrast to the parsimonious-or
even non-existent-information that has been furnished to shareholders of most
Russian companies.
Section 1.3.3 continues with a specific and very welcome recommendation,
namely, that the information presented to shareholders on a particular issue
should include a statement of the position of the board of directors on that issue.
Because of the importance of the board of directors in the governance of the
company, its position on an issue submitted to shareholders is of great relevance
to the decision-making of the shareholders. The Code also suggests that the
position of dissenting board members be disclosed.
Another recommendation is that the statement of the agenda disclose the
proponents of each item on the agenda.7
The Code opts to treat in Chapter 3 (rather than Chapter 2) the special
informational requirements for the election of directors. Section 2.3.1 of Chapter
3 sets forth a list of particular biographical information and information as to
business relationships with the company and affiliated persons of the company
that should be furnished with respect to each candidate for election as a director.
The information to be disclosed includes any business interests that may affect
the discharge by the candidate of the duties of a director.
In general, the provisions of Chapter 2 call for a marked change from the
patterns of non-disclosure or minimal disclosure currently followed by most
Russian companies in connection with meetings of shareholders.
VIII. CHAPTER 2. GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING: PROCEDURES
The second principal area covered by Chapter 2 of the Code is that of
facilitating the exercise of voting rights. The Code aims to cure abuses that have,
in the past, impeded the exercise of voting rights.
6. See id.atch.2,§ 1.3.1,[3.
7. See id. § 1.4.2.
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In pursuit of the objectives of fairness to all shareholders and enabling
shareholders to vote in a simple and convenient way, the Code addresses the
following topics and makes the recommendations listed here in abbreviated form:
(1) Notice procedure: companies should provide thirty days notice of
meetings; the procedure for giving notice should assure that notice
reaches all shareholders; electronic notices are encouraged, including
use of the Internet; notice in periodicals requires that the periodical be
freely accessible to most shareholders.8
(2) Lists of persons authorized to participate in shareholders' meetings:
such lists should be available along with other meeting information;
this is necessary in order that shareholders may analyze the
relationships at the forthcoming meeting and may contact other
shareholders.9
(3) Clarity of agenda: agenda items should be clearly defined and
precisely formulated; each proposal should be a separate item. 10
(4) Accessibility of meeting place: meeting place should be convenient and
accessible by public transport; premises should readily accommodate
all shareholders wishing to participate."1
(5) Forms of proxy designation: voting by proxy should be facilitated by
sending blank instruments of proxy along with blank ballots, with
instructions as to filling them out.'2
(6) Registration at the meeting: registration should be made convenient, on
the day proposed for the meeting and at or near the same premises; the
registration procedure should be described in detail in the company's
internal documents and included in the general meeting notice; late-
arrivers should be permitted to register;
3
(7) Right to ask questions: shareholders must be able to ask questions and
receive answers from members of the management bodies, internal
auditors, and the independent auditor of the company; questions may
include those which deal with background and qualifications of
nominees; directors and officers of the company should be present at
meetings as well as internal and external auditors and nominees for
positions to be filled by shareholder vote. 14
8. See id.§ 1.1.1,second ;§ 1.1.3;§ 1.1.4.
9. See id. § 1.2.1.
10. See id. § 1.4.
11. See id. § 1.6.
12. See id. § 1.7.
13. See id. § 2.2 et seq.
14. See id. § 2.1et seq.
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(8) Right to speak: the meeting procedure should allow reasonable time to
speak on and discuss the agenda issues; the chairman of the meeting
must act in good faith. 5
(9) Presentations by key officers and chairpersons of board committees:
time to speak should be allocated to key officers of the company and to
chairmen of the various committees of the board of directors."
(10) Counting of votes: the procedure for counting votes should be
transparent for shareholders, with no possibility for manipulation;
companies should arrange for independent monitoring of the vote
counting process; counting should be completed before the end of the
meeting."
Obviously, compliance or substantial compliance with these recommendations
would enormously enhance investor confidence in the processes of shareholder
democracy in any company. A demonstration by a company of its determination to
assure full and fair participation by all shareholders would constitute recognition of
the most fundamental principle of corporate governance.
IX. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY:
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES
The Code accords a major role to the board of directors and provides much-
needed impetus toward the strengthening of the boards of directors of Russian
companies.
The Code, at the outset of Chapter 3, cites two of the most important
functions of the board of directors, namely:
- "determination of the general strategy of the company;" and
- "control over its executive bodies." 8
Chapter 3 thereafter provides particulars as to these functions of the board.
This articulation of functions can have a highly beneficial effect, both in helping
to interpret and amplify the JSC Law's statements as to the legal duties of the
board and in providing educational material for the guidance of board members.
The Code's statement of the functions and duties of the board of directors
includes the following:
(1) Determination of general strategy: The board should adopt an annual
financial and business plan; adjustments should be made by the
15. See id. § 2.1.1.
16. See id. 3.
17. See id. § 2.4 et seq.
18. See id. at ch. 3, second introductory .
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board during the course of the year based on recommendations of the
company's executive bodies.19
(2) Supervision of the company's financial and economic operations:
The board should supervise operations as needed to ensure full
implementation of the company's financial and business plan,
compliance with established accounting procedures and accuracy of
financial information used by the company; the board should
approve procedures for conducting financial and business operations
and ensuring compliance with such procedures; 20
Author comment: These elements of the board's functions would, in
discussions of corporate governance in the United States be referred
to as constituting the "oversight" responsibility of the board.
(3) Controlling the operations of the executive bodies: The JSC Law
requires that executive bodies are held accountable to the board of
directors; the board of directors has a major role in controlling the
operations of executive bodies; the board of directors should have
the power and responsibility to suspend the general director or other
persons performing the functions of the executive body of the
21
company, even when appointed by the shareholders.
Author comment: I believe these recommendations are of the utmost
importance. In the United States, the responsibility of the board to
evaluate the performance of the CEO and, if necessary, to exercise
the power to remove the CEO are paramount elements of the board's
duties.
(4) Executive employment contracts and compensation: The charter of a
company should explicitly state that the board of directors is
responsible for approving the terms and conditions of employment of
senior executives, including the amount of their compensation; 22 the
board should develop and approve policies for remuneration of
23
senior executives.
(5) Safeguarding rights of shareholders: The Code states:
One of the most important functions of the board of directors is
ensuring compliance with the corporate procedures that provide the
framework for exercising shareholder rights. 4
The Code also recommends (as discussed below in relation to Chapter
5) that the board of directors appoint the corporate secretary, who will
19. See id. § 1.1.
20. See id. § 1.2.1.
21. See id.§ 1.4.1.
22. See id. § 1.4.3.
23. See id. § 1.4.2.
24. See id. § 1.3.1.
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be responsible (subject to the board) for ensuring compliance with such
procedures. 25
(6) Facilitating resolution of conflicts: The board should take "all necessary
steps to prevent and resolve corporate conflicts that may arise between
shareholders and the company's bodies and officers.
'26
While the Code might have stated these duties in more comprehensive and
less particularized terms, the basic elements of board functions are covered.
Two sections of Chapter 3 of the Code call for articulation of board responsibilities
in the constituent documents of the company beyond mere repetition of the authority
specified in Article 65 of the JSC Law. The first of these two sections is section 1.5
which emphasizes the desirability of defining the scope of authority of the board
in the charter so as to avoid ambiguity as to the allocation of powers among the
board of directors, the executive body, and the general meeting of shareholders.
This recommendation is clearly sound, and the charter could and should be the
means of assuring the supremacy of the board's powers, subject only to the
limited powers assigned exclusively to the shareholders by Article 48 of the JSC
Law.
In addition, section 3.4 of Chapter 3 calls for internal documents of the
company incorporating "a detailed list of duties of the board of directors so that
members of the board of directors may discharge them with utmost efficiency."
While it is doubtful that the list can be truly "detailed," in view of the broad
sweep of director responsibilities, the objective is clear, and such a list can be
descriptive and helpful.27
X. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY: COMPOSITION
The Code makes an extremely important contribution to better corporate
governance in Russia through its recommendations concerning the composition
of the board of directors.
The Code properly refrains from making any recommendation as to a
specific number of directors as being the ideal number. The Code calls for
directors who "have the knowledge, skills and experience required" for making
the kinds of decisions the board will confront and for performing efficiently the
functions of the board of the particular company."' The Code in the same section
recommends that the charter of the company "explicitly sets forth specific criteria
for members of the board of directors."
25. See id.
26. See id. § 1.3.2.
27. 1 cannot refrain from calling attention to an excellent educational tool: THE CORPORATE DIRECrOR'S
GUIDEBOOK (3rd ed. 2001), published by the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. Albeit
written for directors of U.S. companies, the Guidebook articulates principles equally applicable to directors of
Russian companies.
28. The Russian Corporate Governance Code, supra note 2, at ch. 3, § 2.1.3.
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I question the use of the word "specific" in characterizing the appropriate
criteria. The specific qualifications desired at any particular time will vary
according to the existing make-up of the board. For example, depending on the
needs of the company and the composition of the board at a particular time, a
vacancy might be best filled by an investment banker, an engineer, an advertising
executive or a human resources expert. Thus, flexibility in the selection criteria is
needed.
The JSC Law, as recently amended, precludes having a board of which more
than one-fourth of the members are also members of the collegial executive
board (Article 66(2)), and the Code refers to this limitation.9
The Code achieves a dramatic advance in corporate governance standards in
Russia by recognizing the need to draw a line between non-employee directors
(i.e., "outside" directors) who are free from any significant relationship to the
members of the company's management and those who do have such a
relationship. ° The Code recommends classifying as "independent" directors only
those that do not have a significant relation to management. The Code then
recommends that the number of independent directors should comprise at least
one-fourth of the total number of directors and, in any event, that the charter
should provide that the board include at least three independent directors.3'
Ideally, the independent directors should constitute a majority of the total
membership of the board, but the minimum established by the Code is a good
beginning.
The recommended criteria for independent status are set forth in Section
2.2.2 of Chapter 3. Disqualification from "independent" status as a director of a
company (I shall refer to it as "Company A") can arise from:
- employment by Company A within the least three years;
- being an affiliated person of an officer of Company A;
- contractual relationships with Company A that produce significant
income to the director (more than 10% of annual income);
- being a business partner of Company A where the annual value of
the transactions with Company A exceeds 10% of the asset value of
Company A;
- service as an officer of another company if any of the officers of
Company A is a member of the appointments and remuneration
committee of the board of directors of such other company;
- being a representative of the government; and
- service as a director of the company for seven or more years.
29. See id. § 2.2. 1.
30. See id. § 2.2.1.
31. See id. § 2.2.3.
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There is one respect in which I think the disqualification goes too far. The
definition of "independent" would disqualify an "affiliated person" of the
company and also "an affiliated person of such affiliated persons." This would
disqualify a natural person who owns more than twenty percent of the voting
shares of the company and also an officer of a corporate shareholder of that
magnitude. I believe that, in the absence of other relationships to the management
of the company, neither a large individual shareholder nor an officer or director
of a large corporate shareholder that has no material business relationships with
the company (other than its share ownership) should be disqualified. To illustrate
the point: if an investment company is the owner of over twenty percent of the
shares of a Russian company, but has no other relationship to the management of
the Russian company, an officer of the investment company should be eligible to
serve and be classified as an "independent" director.
The Code presumably contemplates that either the charter or internal
documents of a company will define the eligibility criteria for independent
directors. Thus, companies can adjust or modify the criteria recommended by the
Code. Indeed, the charter or internal documents could provide some flexibility by
establishing a mechanism for evaluating the independence of a particular
candidate for the position of director. Such a provision would prevent undue
rigidity in the application of criteria.
The Code addresses the issue of potential conflicts of interest of members of
the board of directors in sections 2.1.2 and 3.1.4 of Chapter 3 and emphasizes the
need for avoidance of conflicts and the disclosure of unavoidable conflicts.
The principle that directors may not use confidential information concerning
the company to promote their personal interests is well stated in section 3.3.
Disclosure in writing by members of the board of proposed transactions by them
in securities of the company is called for in section 3.3, which is a very salutary
provision.
XI. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY: RECOMMENDATION
AS TO SLATE OF DIRECTORS FOR ELECTION
While not set forth with special prominence, one of the most significant
recommendations of the Code, in my view, is set forth in section 2.3.3, final
paragraph of Chapter 3. That recommendation is that the board of directors should
communicate to the shareholders its recommendations as to the slate of directors to
be elected. This procedure, which parallels the procedure in the United States, would
help to provide guidance to shareholders. More specifically, a board recommendation
as to the directors to be elected: (1) enables the shareholders to distinguish between
candidates who have been favorably evaluated by the board and those whose
candidacy arises from self-nomination or nomination by another shareholder; and (2)
enables the board to present to the shareholders a slate that meets all statutory criteria
and includes a sufficient number of independent directors to satisfy the requirements
of the particular company.
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This recommendation logically raises the issue of providing a nominating
committee of the board, which I discuss below under heading XIII.
XII. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY:
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Section 4.1 of Chapter 3 sets forth extensive provisions as to the recommended
functions of the chairman of the board. 31 It also sets forth in unequivocal terms the ideal
chairperson:
It should be a person of undisputed integrity, steadfastness and commitment to
the interests of the company, enjoying the unconditional trust of shareholders
and members of the board of directors.33
While one may doubt the likelihood of finding enough such virtuous persons
to fill the needs of all Russian companies, one cannot help but applaud the
portrayal of the ideal candidate.
The Code would place responsibility on the chairperson for organizing the
committees of the board and for oversight of their work.3
The Code calls for provisions of internal documents establishing procedures
for the conduct of board meetings.35 Meetings at least once every six weeks are
recommended.36
Procedures permitting the adoption of resolutions by absentee ballot are
recommended, but personal voting at a face-to-face meeting is recommended for
specific major actions.37
Emphasis is properly given in the Code to the importance of providing the
directors with full information at the same time that notice of the meeting is sent
out, with respect to issues on the agenda.38 The Code also properly underscores
the fact that the directors must "have an opportunity to request information from
members of executive bodies and officers of the company, and receive full and
,,39
accurate answers.
The unfettered right of all directors to any and all information about the
company is not one that has been recognized or honored by many general
directors of Russian companies. Nevertheless, it is a critically important right,
and the Code performs a great service by underscoring this right.
32. Under the JSC Law, Article 66(2), the chief executive officer of a Russian company (acting as an
individual executive body) may not also be chairman of the board.
33. See Russian Corporate Governance Code, supra note 2, at ch. 3, § 4.1.1.
34. See id. § 4.1.5.
35. See id. § 4.2.3.
36. See id. § 4.2.1, 2.
37. See id. § 4.4.
38. See id. § 4.2.
39. See id. § 4.6, 2.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 16
In section 4.15 of Chapter 3, the Code recommends a stricter quorum
requirement than that established by the JSC Law (i.e., not less than one-half of
the number of elected directors) for certain matters. The Code suggests that the
presence of two-thirds of the elected members of the board should be required for
votes on specified important issues.
Section 4.16.1 calls for detailed minutes of meetings and "verbatim
reports... a word-for-word account of discussions held on each matter." I
believe that this recommendation is unrealistic and impractical. If the objective is
to enable dissenting directors to record their negative vote on a resolution, that
can be done in a single simple sentence in the minutes.
XIII. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY:
COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD
The Code makes another major contribution to corporate governance in
Russia by emphasizing the importance of committees of the board. The following
paragraph of section 4.7.1 of Chapter 3 states the matter effectively:
Establishment of such committees staffed by members of the board of
directors with experience and knowledge in the appropriate areas will
enhance the efficiency and improve the quality of work performed by the
board of directors and, as a result, will facilitate creation of effective
control mechanisms to supervise the operation of executive bodies.
The Code recommends that the board establish four particular committees,
among any others that the board deems necessary or appropriate.40 These are:
(1) strategic planning committee;
(2) audit committee;
(3) human resources and remuneration committee; and
(4) corporate conflicts resolution committee.
With respect to all except the strategic planning committee, the Code recommends
that the above committees consist exclusively of independent directors.4'
In many boards the function of the first committee mentioned above,
strategic planning, will be viewed as a function of the entire board, working
closely with key executives. Thus, many boards may prefer to conduct strategic
planning as a full board, without a strategic planning committee.
40. See id. § 4.7.1.
41. See id. § 4.10.3 (as to human resources and remuneration committee); Id. § 4.11, % 3 (as to the
corporate conflicts resolution committee); Id. at ch. 8, § 1.3.1 (as to the audit committee). In each case the Code
adds a comment to the effect that, if staffing exclusively with independent directors is "impossible" for
"objective" reasons, the committee should at least be headed by an independent director and consist of directors
who are not officers or employees of the company.
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The second committee recommended, the audit committee, is extremely
important, and the inauguration of an audit committee of the board of directors
would constitute a great strengthening of the corporate governance structure of
Russian companies. The Code crystallizes the need for the audit committee in
these terms:
The audit committee ensures actual participation of the board of directors in
the supervision of the company's financial and business operations....
[M]embers of the board of directors need professional information about the
financial and business operations of the company to enable the board of
directors to control the implementation of the company's financial and
business plan, and to ensure the efficiency of its internal control and risk
management systems.42
The Code further states in the succeeding paragraph that one of the main
functions of the audit committee is to recommend to the board of directors the
independent auditing firm that will audit the company's financial statements, and
also to interact with the independent auditing firm. In my view these are critical
functions, and the Code has again identified an important need for Russian
companies. Further discussion of the audit committee appears under heading
XXIV.
The third committee recommended by the Code, the human resources and
remuneration committee, is clearly essential. It is generally referred to in the
United States simply as the "compensation committee." The human resources
and remuneration committee has the critically important task of determining the
compensation policy for both members of the board of directors and for
executive officers. 43 The committee also prepares and approves the terms and
conditions of employment contracts for the director general and other key
executive officers." The committee is responsible for determining the company
policy in respect of health insurance, pensions, and similar benefits.45
The Code assigns to the human resources and remuneration committee the
function of determining "eligibility criteria" applicable to candidates for positions of
director general and other key executive offices.46 This subject is closely related to
the matter of compensation, and thus, the allocation of this responsibility to the
committee on human resources and remuneration seems reasonable.
"However, the Code also assigns to the human resources and remuneration
committee the function of determining the eligibility criteria applicable to
candidates for the position of member of the board of directors., 47 As noted
42. See id. at ch. 3, § 4.9, 12.
43. Seeid. § 4.10.1(2).
44. See id. § 4.10.1(4).
45. See id. § 4.10.1(2).
46. See id. §4.10.1(3).
47. Id. § 4.10.1(1).
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below, I believe that this function should be in a nominating committee that is
concerned principally or solely with identifying and recommending candidates
for the board of directors.
The fourth committee recommended by the Code, the corporate conflicts
resolution committee, is not a customary committee in the United States. Intra-
corporate disputes are so varied in their nature that "ad hoc" procedures for
dealing with them may be more effective than relying on a standing committee
charged with dispute resolution. On the other hand, a committee called the
"corporate governance" committee has become popular in the United States, and
in practice, it may well be that the functions visualized by the Code for the
corporate conflicts resolution committee are similar to those that would be
assigned to a corporate governance committee. For example, disputes involving
shareholder rights or the conduct of corporate directors and officers might well
be appropriate subject matter for the corporate conflicts resolution committee of
a Russian company and for the corporate governance committee of a U.S.
company.
One additional committee that I believe would be highly beneficial for most
companies is the directors nominating committee. The nominating committee
would consider the needs of the board, in terms of the backgrounds of its
members and the possible gaps in the training or experience that it would be
desirable to fill in the case of the particular company; would gather names of
possible candidates; would apply the criteria for board membership to such
candidates; and would evaluate the qualifications of each candidate. The report of
a nominating committee would make the work of the full board of directors in
nominating a slate of directors far more informed than as if there were no
nominating committee. A further and very important advantage of a nominating
committee, assuming it consists principally or entirely of independent directors,
is that the selected candidates do not feel beholden to the management of the
company and will better perform the role of independent directors.
XIV. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY: STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT AND EXPOSURE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
The Code essentially accepts the language of the JSC Law, Article 71, which
articulates the standard of care expected of directors. Article 71(1) of the JSC
Law provides:
The members of a company's board of directors ... must act in the
interests of the company, exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties
with regard to the company in good faith and reasonably.
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The Code expands this standard by stating that:
holding a director liable depends on whether the director acted
reasonably and in good faith, i.e., whether the director exercised
diligence and care, which should be expected from a good manager, and
whether the director took all steps to perform his/her functions properly.
48
The Code also seeks to parallel the common law doctrine generally referred
to as the "business judgment rule." The Code states:
A member of the board of directors is deemed to be acting reasonably
and in good faith if he is not personally interested in a specific decision
and has thoroughly examined all information required for making such
decision; and, at the same time, all concomitant circumstances should
testify that the director is acting exclusively in the best interests of the
49
company.
However, this articulation is less protective than the common law business
judgment rule in that the language "is acting exclusively in the best interests of
the company" could be interpreted as establishing an objective test of whether the
decision is in fact in the best interests of the company. The generally accepted
statement of the business judgment rule in the United States gives far greater
weight to the director's good faith belief that he is acting in the best interests of
the company, which is essentially a subjective test. I anticipate that the Code
would be, and I believe that it should be, interpreted to incorporate the more
subjective standard.
The Code, in section 6.1.2 of Chapter 3, recommends that companies carry
directors' and officers' liability insurance.
I believe that the liability provisions set forth in section 6 of Chapter 3 of the
Code strike a reasonable balance between the accountability of directors and the
limits of exposure to liability that are tolerable for the recruitment of well
qualified board candidates.
XV. CHAPTER 3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY:
REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS
Article 64(2) of the JSC Law requires that the compensation of directors be
approved by the shareholders.
The Code recommends that the human resources and remuneration committee
(i.e., the compensation committee) of the board should develop, and the board should
approve, criteria for determination of the amount of remuneration payable to
48. See id. § 6.1.1,13.
49. See id.
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members of the board of directors. Presumably the committee would recommend
actual amounts of compensation to the board, since Article 64(2) of the JSC Law
appears to require that the board present specific amounts to the shareholders.
The Code recommends that compensation for all directors be the same,
whether or not they are employees of the company." This suggests that a director
who is an employee will receive directors' fees in addition to his compensation
as an employee. While this is entirely reasonable, I note that it differs from U.S.
practice. The human resources and compensation committee, in fixing the
salaries of executive officers who are also directors, would presumably consider
the aggregate amount of the two sources of compensation.
XVI. CHAPTER 4. EXECUTIVE BODIES OF THE COMPANY:
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES
The Code articulates the functions of the executive bodies of the company as
follows:
... [E]xecutive bodies carry out the following tasks: they are responsible for
everyday operations of the company and their compliance with the financial
and business plan of the company, and act timely, efficiently and in good faith
to fulfill resolutions passed by the board of directors and the general
shareholders meeting. 2
This summary statement of functions seems entirely appropriate. However, the
Code appears to me to misplace the responsibility for oversight of the executive bodies
when it calls for implementation of procedures placing executive bodies under the
effective control of shareholders.53
The shareholders do not "control" the executive bodies in my view. The
responsibility for control of the executive bodies properly lies with the board of
directors, as I believe all other pertinent sections of the Code envisage.
Section 1.2 of Chapter 4 calls for the executive bodies to operate the day-to-day
affairs of the company in accordance with the financial and business plan annually
approved by the board. Section 1.2 states, further, that the "[e]xecutive bodies should
seek the approval of the board of directors for transactions that are beyond the scope
of the financial and business plan" and that the company "should develop internal
documents detailing procedures for obtaining approval for operations outside the
scope of the financial and business plan."
50. See id. § 5.1.2.
51. See id. § 5.1.1.
52. See id. at ch. 4, introductory 4.
53. See id. introductory 91 5.
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The Code recommends assignment to the executive bodies of a wide range of
matters in relation to subsidiaries and affiliates of the company, 54 as well as a
wide range of employee relations matters.5 5
XVII. CHAPTER 4. EXECUTIVE BODIES OF THE COMPANY: COMPOSITION
The Code emphasizes the need for executive bodies to consist of individuals
who have "professional qualifications required for managing the current affairs of the
company."56 The director general should have "both specialized and managerial
experience."57 The executive officers should have "impeccable reputations" and
should not have conflicts of interest arising from connections with competing
companies. 8
The Code recommends the creation of a "collective" or "collegial" executive
body, as permitted by the JSC Law, Article 69(1). The JSC Law itself is neutral
on the issue of whether the corporation elects to have a single individual
constitute the sole executive body or whether a collegial executive board is
created. I believe the Code should be similarly neutral on this point. Reasonable
arguments can be made in favor of a single chief executive officer who selects
his key staff and department heads and who draws upon these individuals for
advice and decision-making on a flexible and relatively informal basis. As noted
below under heading XIX, the existence of a formal managerial board tends to be
accompanied by an array of procedural requirements.
XVIII. CHAPTER 4. EXECUTIVE BODIES OF THE COMPANY: STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT AND EXPOSURE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
Section 3.1 of Article 4 imposes on the corporate executives essentially the
same standard of conduct as that established for directors, namely, the obligation
to act reasonably, in good faith, and in the best interests of the company.
Section 3.1.1 adds that "they should use the diligence and care that could be
expected from a good manager in a similar situation and under similar circumstances."
Section 6.1.1 establishes the same degree of exposure to personal liability as
for directors, including the same articulation of a "business judgment rule."
Coverage by "D&O" insurance is recommended, as in the case of directors. 9
Gift acceptance is restricted in the same terms as for directors. The same
ground rules as those applicable to directors are set forth prohibiting the use of
61
confidential information for personal interests.
54. See id. § 1.1.4.
55. See id. § 1.1.5.
56. Id. § 2. 1.1, 1.
57. Id. § 2.1.1,12.
58. Id. §§ 2.1.2,2.1.3.
59. See id. § 6.1.2, 1.
60. See id. § 3.1.2,12.
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Included among the specified responsibilities of the executive bodies is a
reference to the role of stakeholders other than stockholders: their interests
should be taken into account by the executive bodies." Particularly appropriate is
the suggestion that "executive bodies of a company that is the main enterprise in
a certain locality should also take into account the impact of their decisions on
the economy and welfare of the population in that locality."63 It should be noted
that these recommendations do not (and properly so) elevate the interests of other
stakeholders over the interests of shareholders. The primary objective of the
corporation must be to achieve long-term profit and gain for the shareholders.
However, as a practical matter that objective can be achieved only by recognizing the
importance to the company of the other stakeholders with interests in the company,
such as employees, customers, suppliers, and governmental bodies.
The Code advocates that the executive bodies "strive to create an environment in
which employees value their employment with the company and recognize that
their financial position depends on the company's general success." 6 The Code
also makes a particular point as to the responsibility of the executive bodies for
furthering the health of employees and providing adequate job safety.65
XIX. CHAPTER 4. EXECUTIVE BODIES OF THE COMPANY:
PROCEDURES
Section 4 of Chapter 4 deals with meetings of the collective or collegial
executive body, assuming that the company has provided for such a collective
executive body. Section 4.1.1 calls for regular meetings at least once a week;
sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 provide for adequate notice of meetings and for the
timely furnishing of information as to matters on the agenda. Section 4.1.5,
consistent with Article 70(2) of the JSC Law, calls for minutes to be kept of all
meetings and requires that they be furnished to members of the board of
directors, the audit commission, and the external auditor, and section 4.1.5
recommends that the minutes also be furnished to the control and audit service of
the company.
I believe that these recommended formalities would tend to create rigidity. A case
can be made that decision-making at the level of the chief executive officer of the
company should be achieved by such informal groupings of top executives as the CEO
may find most efficient and productive. Thus, I repeat my recommendation that the
Code should be neutral on the issue of whether to have a collegial executive body or a
single executive body.
61. See id. § 3.2.
62. See id. § 3.3.
63. ld. § 3.3,13.
64. Id. § 3.4, T1.
65. See id. 5.
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XX. EXECUTIVE BODIES OF THE COMPANY:
REMUNERATION
Section 5 of Chapter 4 deals with compensation of executive officers and looks to
the human resources and remuneration committee (compensation committee) of the
board to develop compensation packages that provide incentives to executive officers
to produce favorable financial results and remain with the company. Suggestions are
made as to severance pay, non-compete, and confidentiality provisions in executive
employment contracts.
XXI. CHAPTER 5. SECRETARY OF THE COMPANY
The Code recommends that the company should appoint (or elect):
a special officer whose sole objective should be to ensure that corporate bodies
and officers comply with procedural requirements safeguarding the rights and
interests of the company's shareholders, namely, the secretary of the
66
company.
The Code enumerates broad duties for the secretary, but places the secretary
squarely under the control of the board of directors, which is, in my view, a
correct allocation of responsibility. The Code states:
The main role in safeguarding the rights and interests of the shareholders
is ultimately played by the board of directors. Therefore, the secretary of
the company should be accountable to, and controlled by, the board of
directors in accordance with the terms and conditions of his/her employment
contract. In this connection, it is advisable that the appointment of the
secretary of the company and definition of the terms and conditions of the
contract made with him/her, including the amount of remuneration, are also
within the authority of the board of directors. 67
Section 1.7 of Chapter 5 calls upon the secretary to notify the chairman of the
board of directors of all violations of corporate procedures, compliance with
which is a responsibility of the secretary. This line of reporting is consistent with
the overall authority of the board.
The duties of the secretary, as specified in the Code, are primarily ministerial
in nature. They include:
- making arrangements for the proper holding of all meetings of the
shareholders, including preparing the list of eligible voters, giving
proper notice, providing access to informational material, reviewing
66. See id. at ch. 5, introductory 5.
67. See id. § 2.1, 2.
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the ballots, keeping the minutes of the meeting, and responding to
shareholder questions in connection with the holding of the
meeting;68
- handling all administrative matters in connection with meetings of
the board of directors;69
- assisting members of the board of directors in the performance of
their functions, particularly in connection with providing access to
corporate documents;70
- briefing newly-elected members of the board of directors on
corporate procedures;71 and
- maintaining corporate records and assuring access to such records by
shareholders to the extent required by law.72
Section 1.3.3 states that the secretary of the company "should provide members
of the board of directors with interpretations of the provisions of existing legislation,
the charter and other internal documents of the company that deal with procedural
issues related to the preparation and holding of the general shareholders meeting,
meetings of the board of directors, and disclosure (provision) of information about
the company." It would seem important that the secretary should consult general
counsel for the company in connection with any issues involving the interpretation of
legislation and constituent documents of the company.
Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 of Chapter 5 contain reference to the secretary's duties
to ensure proper disclosure of information about the company. Imposing these duties
on the secretary adds to the likelihood of proper disclosure by the company, but I
believe that the board of directors must remain ultimately responsible for meeting
disclosure requirements. Accordingly, I would recommend clarifying language to
assure that the functions assigned to the secretary in relation to disclosure are not
construed as relieving the board of directors of its overall responsibility in respect of
disclosure.
XXII. CHAPTER 6. MAJOR CORPORATE ACTIONS
Chapter X of the JSC Law contains special provisions as to the approval of
major transactions, as defined in Article 78(1) of the JSC Law. Chapter 6 of the
Code seeks to expand the scope of the JSC Law by including more transactions
within the scope of "major" transactions and by adding specificity to the JSC
Law.
68. See id. § 1.1 et seq.
69. See id. § 1.2 et seq.
70. See id. §1.3.1.
71. See id. § 1.3.2.
72. See id. § 1.4 et seq.
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The Code recommends in section 1.1 of Chapter 6 that corporate charters
expand the coverage of the "major transaction" provisions to include all
transactions that may have "a significant effect on the company."
Three specific situations are noted:
(1) transactions that involve property the value of which exceeds a certain
absolute limit;"
(2) transactions involving "certain types of company assets that have special
significance for its business operations;"7 4 and
(3) transactions involving the sale of a block of shares of a subsidiary
resulting in the company losing its majority stake in that subsidiary's
charter capital.75
These recommended expansions of the concept of "major transaction," to be
achieved by charter amendment, seem entirely appropriate.
Section 2 of Chapter 6 embarks on the field of corporate takeovers, a field
which has been highly contentious in the United States and which has presented a
daunting challenge for legislators and regulators in the United States. The
provisions of the Code are balanced in their approach in the sense that they
recognize that there is a place for some anti-takeover devices, but they also
recognize the dangers of management's finding ways of protecting its own
interests at the expense of the shareholders. Section 2.1 properly emphasizes the
right and the obligation of the board of directors to communicate to shareholders
its opinion as to the merits of a particular tender offer, i.e., an offer to buy the
shares of the shareholders.
Section 3.1 of Chapter 6 stresses the important role of the board of directors
in the negotiation of the terms of a reorganization or merger and recommends
that the board of directors establish a special committee for interaction with the
executive bodies in relation to the matter. 6 The Code also seeks to assure that the
board has in-depth information before resolving to submit a reorganization
proposal to the shareholders.7
Section 3.2 recommends that the services of an "independent assessor" should be
employed to determine the conversion value of shares, even though retention of an
independent assessor is not required by existing law. I believe that section 3.2 needs
clarification as to the purpose of this recommendation, since the share conversion ratio
in a negotiated merger or consolidation will be determined by agreement reached
between the parties. Each party would undoubtedly retain its own advisers as to share
value, but in the typical transaction negotiated at arm's length, there would be no need
for a "determination" of conversion value by an independent assessor. If the Code is
73. See id. at ch. 6, § 1.1, 3.
74. Id. §1.1, 3.
75. See id.§ l.1, [2.
76. Seeid. § 3.1.1, 11.
77. See id. § 3.1.2.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 16
suggesting the retention of an independent assessor simply in order to have a "fairness"
opinion that can be shown to shareholders, I suggest that section 3.2 be supplemented
to so state.
XXIII. CHAPTER 7. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMPANY
Chapter 7 is arguably the most important chapter of the Code in that it sets
forth in expansive and unequivocal terms a fundamental principle of corporate
conduct for publicly owned companies in a free market system, namely, the
disclosure of all material information about the company. The Code states:
The disclosure of information is vitally important for evaluation of a
company's progress by its shareholders and potential investors.
The goal of disclosure is to provide information to all interested parties
to enable them to make informed decisions regarding participation in the
company or actions that can affect the company's financial and business
transactions. 78
The Chapter deals with five principal topics:
(1) information policy;
(2) principal disclosure documents and topics for disclosure;
(3) responsibility for disclosure;
(4) methods of disclosure and distribution channels;
(5) confidential corporate information.
A. Information Policy
The Code articulates the elements of information policy that all companies
should pursue:
- "A company's information policy should guarantee unhindered and low-
cost access to information about the company." 79
- Information must be well-balanced, and essential negative information
must not be withheld. °
- "The Company should promptly disclose information about all
factors that may be material to shareholders and investors."'"
- The Company should adopt a Regulation on Information Policy that
78. See id. at ch. 7, introductory 1, 3.
79. Id.§ 1.1.
80. See id. introductory 5.
81. Id. § 2.3, tit.
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enumerates a detailed list of the categories of information that should
be disclosed. 82
B. Principal Disclosure Documents
The Code highlights four documents as the principal disclosure documents:
(a) Company financial statements;8 3
(b) Prospectuses: In addition to financial information and information
required by law, the Code calls for:8
(i) "all information that may be of importance" for evaluation of the
offered securities (Section 2.1.1);
(ii) information on members of the board of directors and management
(Section 2.1.2);
(iii) dividend policy (Section 2.1.3);
(iv) shareholders owning 5% or more of the shares and their affiliates;
indirect holdings to be included (Section 2.1.4);
(v) voting agreements (Section 2.1.4);
(vi) transactions with entities of which senior executives own 20% or
more "or which are otherwise subject to the influence of such
executives" (Section 2.1.5);
(vii) transactions with entities that have direct or indirect control of the
company, or are controlled by the company, or are under common
control with the company, and transactions with individuals who
are affiliates of the foregoing (Section 2.1.5);
(viii) statement of the reasons for issuing new shares; identification of
parties which intend to purchase a large percentage of the shares,
and whether senior executives will purchase shares offered
(Section 2.1.6);
(ix) additional measures of financial performance and financial condition
(Section 2.1.7); and
(x) management's estimate of factors that could influence the company's
financial position (Section 2.1.7, third paragraph).
(c) Annual Report: The Code calls for comprehensive information, much of
it corresponding to the information called for in a prospectus for the
issuance of shares." The report is to be signed by the company's general
director, its financial and accounting officers and the members of the
82. See id. § 1.1.1, 12.
83. See id. § 3.2.1.
84. See id. § 2.1.
85. See id. § 3.3.
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board of directors. Dissenting views should be presented to shareholders
along with the annual report of the company.86
(d) Quarterly reports: The Code calls for the information required by law in
the quarterly reports. The Code also recommends that the quarterly
report for the fourth quarter should contain a report as to the extent of the
company's compliance with the recommendations of the Code."
C. Responsibility for Disclosure
The Code calls for approval by the board of directors of an internal company
document setting forth information policy and, as noted above, requires the
signature of the board members on the company's annual report. However, the
Code lacks a clear statement as to the overall responsibility of the board of
directors for assuring full and timely disclosure, although this responsibility is
arguably implicit in the Code's provisions. The Code states in section 1.1.1 of
Chapter 7 that "[a] company's executive bodies are responsible for disclosure."
This is certainly true, but I believe that this statement should be coupled with a
strong expression of the board's responsibility.
The Code further imposes special responsibilities on the secretary of the
company, including assuring access by shareholders to documents that they are
entitled to see.88
The Code sets forth an extensive list of information to be available to
shareholders in connection with a meeting of shareholders." As noted in
connection with the discussion of Chapter 5, the secretary is charged with the
responsibility for assembling and making documents available to shareholders.
D. Methods of Disclosure and Distribution Channels
The Code calls for disclosure of information through the company's website,
as well through as the channels of disclosure required by law. 9°
With specific reference to the company's financial statements, the Code
recommends that companies with more than ten thousand shareholders should
publish their financial statements in at least two periodicals with a circulation of
at least fifty thousand copies each.9
86. See id. § 3.3.8.
87. See id. § 2.2, 13.
88. See id. § 3.1.
89. See id. § 3.2 et seq.
90. See id. § 1.1.2, [2.
91. See id.§ 1.1.2, 4.
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E. Confidential Information
The Code recognizes that there is a body of information about a company
that constitutes trade or professional secrets. 9' However, the Code protects against
possible misuse of the right to withhold confidential information by calling on
the board of directors to adopt an internal corporate document specifying the list
of items that constitute trade or professional secrets and establishing access
procedures.93
XXIV. CHAPTER 8. SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS
OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY
Chapter 8 deals with four bodies that have a role in supervision of financial
and business operations of the company. Two of these bodies are prescribed by
the JSC Law and two are recommended by the Code. These are:
- the audit committee of the board of directors (recommended);
- an internal control and audit service (recommended);
- the audit commission (statutory); and
- the external, independent auditor or auditing firm (statutory).
A. The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
The greatest contribution of Chapter 8, in my view, is to prescribe broad
functions for the audit committee of the board of directors.
The Code provides (to some extent duplicating the provisions discussed
under heading XIII above):
It is recommended that the company's board of directors create a special
board committee to exercise efficient direct control over financial and
business activity and, most of all, over performance of the financial and
business plan-the audit committee, responsible for this particular aspect
of the board of directors' responsibilities. 4
The Code adopts an extremely important position as to composition of the
audit committee, namely, that it should consist solely of independent directors.95 I
consider this to be a cornerstone of the Code in terms of its importance for the
future of Russian corporate governance. For Russian companies seeking to list on
the New York Stock Exchange, such composition would be mandatory. The
Code goes one step further as to qualifications and states that "members of the
92. See id. § 4.1.
93. See id. § 4.1.1,13.
94. Id.atch.8,§ 1.1.2, 2.
95. See id. § 1.3.1.
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audit committee should possess special knowledge of the basics of accounting
and financial reporting."'
The Code recommends that the audit committee hold meetings at least once a
month and prepare its recommendations for the board of directors.9 This
recommendation bespeaks the Code's expectation of a very active role for the
audit committee of the board of directors. Among other functions, the audit
committee would
(1) monitor the activities of the internal control and audit service and
make recommendations for improvement of the internal control
system;
98
(2) receive reports from the head of the control and audit service as to
"the performance of the financial and business plan and deviations
from it;' 9
(3) present to the board of directors the opinions of the audit committee
"on errors and violations, revealed over the relevant period of
company activity; ' '
(4) receive reports from the independent auditor as to violations of
legislation and corporate rules and take appropriate steps to remedy
the same;101
(5) evaluate the work of the independent auditor and evaluate its
opinion; ° and
(6) evaluate candidates for the independent auditor and make
recommendations to the board of directors as to a selection of the
independent auditor.0°3
I believe that the Code would be improved if the duties of the audit
committee included expressly:
- review of the company's financial statements;
- consideration of major questions of choice respecting the appropriate
auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used in the
preparation of the financial statements.
However, the present language of the Code can be interpreted to encompass
these functions.
96. ld. § 1.3.2.
97. See id. § 1.4.
98. See id. §§ 1.1.2, third 1, § 1.2, final 1.
99. Id. § 2.3.1, 3.
100. Id. § 2.3.2.
101. Id. § 4.1.3, 2.
102. See id. § 4.1.5.
103. See id. § 4.1.7, $ 2.
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In summary, I believe the Code lays the foundation for the evolution of
strong and active audit committees of boards of directors-a much needed
development in Russian corporate governance.
B. Internal Control and Audit Service
The Code places great emphasis on the need for an efficient internal control
system and recommends that:
the company should establish a control and audit service, a structural
subdivision of the company responsible for ongoing internal supervision
and acting independently of the executive bodies of the company.104
The Code suggests that the structure and composition of the control and audit
service should be provided by an internal document of the company approved by
the board of directors. 5
It is recommended further that the internal control system should be
developed by the control and audit service of the company and approved by the
board of directors.'° The Code further recommends that at least two-thirds of the
employees of the control and audit service have a high level of financial or legal
education.1 °7
The principal function of the control and audit service would be to assure
conformity of actual operations with the financial and business plan adopted by
the board of directors.04 The Code dwells on the concept of "operations falling
outside the framework of the financial and business plan," which the Code refers
to as "non-standard operations. ' O The Code calls for charter provisions and
internal documents of the company that set forth "a special procedure for
carrying out non-standard operations."" 0 The control and audit service is
expected to "advise the audit committee and the board of directors whether it is
expedient for them to approve such operation.'.
Whether or not one agrees with the Code's preoccupation with "non-standard
operations," the Code ends up in the correct place, namely, reaffirming the power
of the board of directors to modify the business and financial plan at any time.1
104. See id.§ 1.1.1,final$.
105. See id.
106. See id. § 1.2,%% 2, 3.
107. See id.§ 1.3.2,912.
108. See id. § 2.1.
109. Id. § 2.2.
I10. Id. § 2.2.2, 11.
Ill. Id. § 2.2.2, 4
112. Id. § 2.2.3.
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C. The Audit Commission
Article 85 of the JSC Law calls for an audit commission or "inspection"
commission. The Code provides, in section 3 of Chapter 8, specific recommendations
amplifying Article 85 and recommends the approval by the board of directors of
internal documents setting forth the procedures for the Audit Commission to pursue.
The Code recommends that "the audit commission should work in close
cooperation with the audit committee of the board of directors" and "should
provide the audit committee with full information on its activity, continuing
investigations and opinions made.""' 3
My own view is that the significance of the statutory audit commission will
dwindle as audit committees of the board of directors become stronger and more
experienced. I believe that eventually the JSC Law could well be amended to
delete Article 85, without loss to the protection of stockholders.
D. The Independent Auditor or Audit Organization
Article 86 of the JSC Law calls for an individual auditor or an auditing firm
to be retained by the company by contract. This independent auditor or auditing
firm should, according to the Code,
certify compliance of the company's financial reports with the Russian
accounting standards or, if the company is willing to enter international
markets and undertakes to follow international financial reporting
standards, compliance with such international standards."
4
The Code calls upon the independent auditor or auditing firm to ferret out
and report to the board of directors "errors, malpractices or violations of the law
by the company."" 5
In summary, Chapter 8 builds upon the JSC Law and properly assigns to the
audit committee of the board of directors, working with the internal audit
division of the company, much of the activity in monitoring the company's
financial operations that might otherwise be deemed part of the functions of the
statutory audit commission. While some duplication may arise, I believe the
Code moves in the proper direction by centralizing much of the corporate control
in the board of directors and its audit committee.
113. Id. § 3.1.6.
114. See id.§4.1.6.
115. Id. § 4.1.3.
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XXV. CHAPTER 9. DIVIDENDS
Chapter 9 deals with one of the most acute problems of Russian companies
namely, the lack of dividend policy and a seeming indifference to the payment of
dividends. Chapter 9 recognizes that, in addition to receipt of dividends,
shareholder economic benefit also accrues when undistributed profits enhance
net worth." 6 The Code's emphasis on developing a statement of company
dividend payment policy is sound."' The Code also emphasizes the need for
making the investing public fully aware of the dividend policy."
8
The Code calls for the development by the strategic planning committee and
approval by the board of directors of a Regulation on Dividend Policy.'1 9 Section
1.1.2 of Chapter 9 would appear, however, to contemplate a degree of specificity
in the manner of calculation that may be inconsistent with the wide variation in
circumstances that can exist at the time of the declaration of dividends. A broad
area of discretion should lie with the board of directors in determining the portion
of net profit to be directed toward the payment of dividends in any given year.
Accordingly, transparency of the dividend process should not be deemed to
require a degree of specificity in the Regulation on Dividend Policy that impairs
the discretion of the board of directors.
The Code addresses in some detail the importance of prompt and certain
payment of dividends which have been declared. Section 3 of Chapter 9 proposes
severe penalties on the company executives if they fail to implement dividend
payment procedures.
XXVI. CHAPTER 10. RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE CONFLICTS
Chapter 10 of the Code constitutes an innovative approach aimed at
encouraging internal and non-judicial methods of identifying conflicts between
the company and its shareholders and resolving those conflicts as expeditiously
as possible. The Code states:
Prevention and resolution of corporate conflicts makes it possible to
safeguard the rights of shareholders and protect the property interests and
the business reputation of the company.120
The Code provides that inquiries, letters or demands submitted by shareholders
should be directed to the secretary of the company, that the secretary should make a
preliminary review of those communications, and "hand them over to a body whose
116. See id. atch. 9,§ 1.1,912.
117. See id.§ 1.1.1,912.
118. See id. § 1. 1.3.
119. See id.§§ 1.1.1, 1.1.2.
120. See id. at ch. 10, introductory 9 2.
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authority includes resolution of a given corporate conflict."'' The Code urges that "a
company should give a full and detailed answer to a request from a shareholder, and a
denial of a shareholder's request should be well founded and based on provisions of the
law."' 122  1 1
As noted above in the discussion of Chapter 3, the Code proposes that the
board of directors create a "corporate conflict resolution committee."'25 This
committee would be charged to (a) resolve corporate conflicts related to issues
within the board's authority; and (b) review corporate conflicts that are within the
authority of the director general. '2
The Code, adopting an optimistic stance, states:
The principal task to be fulfilled by the company's bodies when
resolving a corporate conflict is to find a lawful and rational solution that
would satisfy the interests of the company.25
The Code extends (in section 3 of Chapter 10) its concern for resolving
disputes to include those disputes that are between two or more shareholders as
distinct from disputes between the company and a shareholder, if the conflict
may affect the interests of the company itself or the interests of other
shareholders. Section 3.1 exhorts the appropriate body of the company to take
"all necessary and appropriate steps to resolve such a conflict." The Code
suggests that the director general or the board committee may offer to act as an
intermediary in the conflict resolution. Subject to the consent of the shareholders
who are parties to the dispute, the company is encouraged to play a very active
role, including giving advice and recommendations."'
I believe that there may well be instances wherein the best interests of the
corporation itself, and of all the shareholders who are not parties to a particular
dispute between shareholders, lie in the direction of non-participation and
inactivity by the company in the dispute. However, the Code properly
contemplates that the preliminary issue of whether or not to participate would be
examined by the board and/or director general, and a determination would be
made as to whether the company's participation would be helpful.
XXVII. CONCLUSIONS
1. The very positive values of the Code have been summarized under heading I
above, "Significance of the Code; Evaluation," and I refer the reader back to the
points made under heading I. As important as any of those values is the fact that the
121. Id. § 1.1.2.
122. Id. § 1.2.1,12.
123. Id. § 2.1.2, 1.
124. See id. § 2.1.2, l, 2.
125. See id. § 2.1.3, 1 l.
126. See id. § 3.1.2.
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promulgation of the Code will compel reexamination of each company's own
practices, and the result is bound to be an elevation of the level of compliance by
Russian companies with good corporate governance practices.
2. The rapid timetable which the FCSM established for itself and to which it
adhered has accelerated the process of reexamination and change. The momentum
that FCSM has generated by its speedy development of the Code should have highly
beneficial effects.
3. The Code should be a "living document." Changes should be made as
experience is gained. The process of soliciting recommendations for amendment of
the Code and the process of evaluating those recommendations will serve to assure a
continuing dialogue on the subject of improvements in corporate governance.
4. In brief, the launching of the Code is, in my view, a spectacular achievement
in the context of Russia's transition to a free market economy. The FCSM and
Chairman Kostikov deserve high praise for their leadership and determination to
advance the cause of good corporate governance in Russia through promulgation of
the Code.
